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1 Introduction
China’s economic achievement over the past three decades is doubtlessly one of the
most outstanding of our time. China has maintained high growth for more than three
decades since the “reform and opening-up policy” it launched in 1978. Economic
reforms carried out thereafter were integral factors in the nation’s high economic
growth. In 2010, China surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in
the world. China is also the largest contributor to world economic growth since
2007. It is projected by some that in one or two decades China will overtake the
United States and become the world’s largest economy, if its relatively rapid growth
is maintained.
However, there are also serious concerns that China may be unable to sustain
its current mode of economic growth much longer, as well as arguments that China
should not seek to sustain such growth given the side eﬀects. Due to the Chinese
economy’s impact on the global economy, the issue of how China can sustain its
growth is of great interest, not only for China and its citizens but also for the world.
The mode of China’s growth is characterized typically by the demand-side com-
ponents of GDP. China’s growth has been heavily driven by investment, and such
“excessive” investment-driven growth has side eﬀects, which eventually may grow too
large to control if China fails to rebalance its economic growth. The Chinese govern-
ment clearly recognizes the need to transform its mode of economic development and
has already implemented important policy measures to this end. But to date it seems
that the progress has been insuﬃcient to substantively rebalance the growth mode.1
It is no simple task for China to smoothly reshape its growth pattern, considering
the complexity of the situation it faces and the potential opposition from those with
vested interest in the current economic system.
Let us turn for a moment to Japan. In the early 1970s, Japan transformed its
mode of growth from an investment-driven one to one driven in a more balanced
manner by investment, consumption, and exports. In the 1970s, the speed of capital
accumulation decelerated while consumption continued to increase rapidly as a result
of a steady rise in workers’ wages. This transformation laid the foundation for Japan
to maintain stable growth after the high-growth era of the 1960s. As shown by
Fukumoto et al. (2010), some basic statistics, such as per capita GDP and the
growth rate of the urban population, suggest the likelihood that present-day China is
roughly at the same stage of economic development as Japan during or prior to the
early 1970s. Although it is not easy to compare the two economies directly, we believe
1 In a recent speech at the Boao Forum for Asia on April 15, 2011, President Hu Jintao stated,
“China has made remarkable achievements in development, but it remains the largest developing
country in the world. Population, resources and the environment have put great pressure on our
economic and social development, and there is lack of adequate balance, coordination or sustainability
in our development.”
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that it is worthwhile to draw some insights from Japan’s experience in the early 1970s,
when much of Japan’s rebalancing of economic growth was accomplished.2
With this in mind, in this paper we try to draw some insights for China from
Japan’s experience of transforming its growth mode in the early 1970s. An impor-
tant previous work in this regard is Minami (1994), who provides a comprehensive
comparative analysis of economic development in Japan and China until the late
1980s. In contrast to his study, ours is more contemporary and more focused on
the issue of economic rebalancing. To facilitate the comparison, most of our analy-
sis is based on data series that allow direct comparison between Japan and China.
Although this study discusses mainly the issue of rebalancing of domestic demand
(hereafter, “domestic rebalancing”), we also investigate whether such domestic rebal-
ancing leads to China’s “external rebalancing,” which would mean a reduction in its
large current account surplus.3
The rest of this paper is summarized as follows. In Section 2, we characterize the
current mode of China’s growth and explain why China needs to rebalance its eco-
nomic growth. In Section 3, we reflect on the rebalancing of Japan’s economic growth
in the early 1970s, focusing mainly on how Japan shifted from heavily investment-
driven economic growth to that driven by investment and consumption in a more
balanced manner. In Section 4, we indicate some insights from Japan’s past expe-
rience in the rebalancing of its own economic growth. We also point out important
diﬀerences between present-day China and Japan in the 1970s, mainly due to institu-
tional factors, and suggest actions China can take to address such factors. In Section
5, we extend our analysis to the external imbalance problem. Drawing from Japan’s
experience, we indicate that China’s domestic rebalancing will not necessarily lead
to its external rebalancing. Section 6 concludes.
2Some readers may consider that Chinese people should not follow Japan’s path because, since
the latter half of the 1980s, Japan experienced the creation and collapse of a bubble economy and the
subsequent prolonged stagnation. However, in the analysis of Fukumoto et.al (2010), we argue that
the current stage of China’s development is much closer to Japan’s 1970s (or even earlier) rather than
its late 1980s. Based on this judgment, we consider that Japan’s experience in the 1970s can provide
some useful insights to the recent issues of China’s rebalancing (especially, domestic rebalancing).
Of course this does not necessarily mean that even in any future China will never face the problem
like Japan’s late 1980s and subsequent periods. In this respect, Shirakawa (2011) argues that, as
the experience of Japan’s bubble economy suggests, during the transition from high growth to stable
growth, a country may face various new challenges, such as (1) preventing bubbles, (2) reviewing
business models, and (3) preparing for demographic changes. We do not preclude the possibility that
China may face these new challenges in some future day.
3 In this study, we do not attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the background of
China’s external imbalance problem (such as exchange rate issues or financial market development).
Rather, in Section 5 we briefly examine the relationship between domestic rebalancing and external
rebalancing, based on Japan’s experience.
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Figure 1: Consumption and Investment in China (as % of nominal GDP)
2 Current Mode of China’s Growth and the Need for
Rebalancing
The most characteristic feature of China’s economic growth is the dominance of do-
mestic investment. In the 1980s, the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to nominal
GDP (hereafter, the investment/GDP ratio) fluctuated around 30 percent (Figure 1).
However, following his “South China speech” in early 1992, Deng Xiaoping guided
China’s economic reform, stimulating both domestic investment and foreign direct in-
vestment.4 The investment/GDP ratio subsequently trended upward, reaching 46.2
percent in 2010.
Table: Investment and Consumption Ratios across Countries
4From January 8 to February 21, 1992, Deng Xiaoping made his famous South China tour,
inspecting Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai. During his trip, he delivered an important
speech, which guided and accelerated the reform and opening up of China’s economy while avoiding
ideological conflict.
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Figure 2: Per Capita GDP and Per Capita Disposable Income in China
In general, emerging countries tend to have a high investment rate during a period
of rapid growth, since the return on capital tends to be high because of low capital
accumulation. Similarly, China has enjoyed a high return on capital. However,
no other emerging country has experienced such a high investment rate (Table).
On the flip side, the ratio of private consumption to nominal GDP (hereafter, the
consumption/GDP ratio) has been declining and stood at 33.8 percent in 2010, the
lowest among major emerging countries. Based on these facts, many analysts feel
that it is becoming increasingly diﬃcult for China to sustain its current mode of
economic growth.5
What is the logic behind the argument that China needs to rebalance its eco-
nomic growth? Drawing on previous studies, we can summarize below the following
conditions that suggest why the current mode of economic growth should be altered.
First and foremost, under the current mode of growth, households have not suf-
ficiently received the benefits of growth. As shown in Figure 2, per capita urban
household income has not risen as rapidly as per capita GDP (Aziz and Cui [2007]).
The governor of the People’s Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, has observed that the
vast majority of Chinese laborers failed to share in the rising profits of the corporate
sector (Zhou [2009]). As a result, China’s labor share has been declining. Although
the living standard of the Chinese people has certainly improved, it has not improved
in line with the growth of GDP.
Second, the current pattern of growth has created fewer urban jobs than a more
labor-intensive pattern. Investment-driven economic growth has made China’s in-
5He and Kuijs (2007) developed a growth scenario that broadly incorporates the features of past
growth and extrapolates them into the future through 2035. Their result suggests that if China
continues its rapid growth under the current mode, its rates of investment would need to increase to
50 to 60 percent of GDP in the decades ahead.
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dustries increasingly capital-intensive. As pointed out by Kuijs and Wang (2006),
capital-intensive industries create fewer jobs than labor-intensive ones such as service
industries. To boost employment, the development of the service sector, supported
by the growth of consumption, is necessary.
Third, investment-driven growth has led to a slowdown in productivity growth.
Lardy (2007) argues that the deceleration of total factor productivity growth since
the early 1990s, which is reported by Kuijs and Wang (2006), can be attributed at
least partly to overinvestment and excess capacity in several important industries,
such as steel.
Fourth, with investment-driven growth, it is quite diﬃcult to improve energy
eﬃciency and reduce damage to the environment. China has been beefing up eﬀorts
to make its economy more energy-eﬃcient and environmentally friendly. However,
investment requires machinery and equipment, so that investment-driven growth by
its nature consumes comparatively more energy.6
The Chinese government is very mindful of the need for China to rebalance its
economic growth, and several relevant measures have been put into practice. The
11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10) declared that China must adjust its proportion of
investment and consumption and reasonably control the size of investment, as well
as increase the contribution of consumption to economic growth.
However, in reality, during the period of the 11th Five-Year Plan, the invest-
ment/GDP ratio rose further, while the consumption/GDP ratio declined. Although
it could be argued that unexpected factors such as the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake
and the global financial crisis hindered China’s progress, to oﬀset the negative im-
pacts of these events the Chinese government initiated a massive economic stimulus
mainly by boosting public investment. In the short term, this measure was inevitable
to prevent China from plummeting into recession. Nevertheless, as a result the in-
vestment/GDP ratio rose even higher, rendering China’s economic development more
disproportionate.7
Thus, to date we have not found suﬃcient progress in the rebalancing of China’s
economic growth, even though its necessity is widely acknowledged. Given the chal-
lenges China faces, it is important to understand the kind of adjustment process
required for the rebalancing of economic growth. In this respect, we believe that it is
beneficial to analyze how rebalancing was accomplished in Japan. Below we elaborate
on this point.
6 In its mid-term report on China’s 11th Five-Year Plan, the World Bank (2008) pointed out,
“Without rebalancing the pattern of growth and the economic and industrial structure, it is unlikely
that the 20 percent reduction target in energy intensity could be achieved.” In fact, the Chinese
government did not achieve the target (the actual reduction in energy intensity was 19.1 percent)
although it introduced some sector-specific measures to reduce energy consumption.
7An eminent Chinese economist, Wu Jinglian, has stated his concern that judging from the
situation from 2009 to 2010, the transformation of the economic development mode has progressed
very little and may actually has worsened (Wu [2011]).
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Figure 3: Consumption and Investment in Japan (as % of nominal GDP)
Figure 4: Return on Capital in Japan
3 Rebalancing of Japan’s Domestic Growth
From 1955 to 1970, Japan achieved high economic growth with an average GDP
growth rate of 9.7 percent. Similar to present-day China, the high growth during this
period was initiated by vigorous investment. The investment/GDP ratio trended up-
ward, while the consumption/GDP ratio decreased (Figure 3). However, the decline
in the consumption/GDP ratio and the rising trend in the investment/GDP ratio
clearly halted in the first half of the 1970s. In retrospect, it is apparent that the early
1970s was the period when Japan achieved its rebalancing.
What were the main factors behind this rebalancing? The most apparent one is
the decline in the return on capital. Figure 4 shows a series for the return on capital,
calculated using the method of Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006).8 During the high-growth
8Strictly speaking, our calculation method diﬀers slightly from Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) in
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Figure 5: Labor Share in Japan
period, the return on capital was higher than 20 percent. In the early 1970s however,
it dropped sharply and never returned to its previous high level.
The decline in the return on capital was basically caused by the slowdown in the
productivity growth of capital. There are a number of reasons for this slowdown.
On the supply side, the process of catching up to advanced foreign technology, which
was a major driving force during Japan’s high-growth period, was virtually complete
around the early 1970s (Kosai [1986]). On the demand side, the consumption boom
in durable goods, brought about by massive population inflows into urban areas,
also concluded as urbanization drew to a close (Yoshikawa [1995]). Consequently, in
the early 1970s the return on capital decreased substantially, and this significantly
reduced firms’ incentives to maintain high investment. This was the basic background
for the decline in the investment/GDP ratio in the early 1970s.
However, we can point out two other important elements that played crucial roles
in Japan’s rebalancing. The first is the rise in the labor share of income. Figure 5
shows that the labor share accomplished a rapid increase of more than 10 percentage
points in only five years (1970-75). The rise of the labor share was triggered by
high inflationary pressure due to the 1973-74 oil crisis, which promoted wage growth.
However, the point is that the rise in the labor share during this period became
permanent rather than temporary.
During the high-growth period, because of the existence of the surplus labor in
the farm village, the level of real wages fell below labor productivity as shown in the
Lewis model (Lewis [1954]). However, according to Minami (1973), the Lewis turning
point had already been reached in the 1960s, and rising pressure on real wages had
increased due to the disappearance of surplus labor. In such circumstances after
the mid-1960s, workers’ sense of entitlement to their “fair share” rose, as shown in
that it does not include net production tax in the numerator of the capital share. See the Appendix.
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Figure 6: Number of Labor Disputes in Japan
the increase in labor disputes (Figure 6), and their bargaining power strengthened.
Consequently, it became diﬃcult to restrain the rise in real wages again after the
end of the oil crisis, and the rise in the labor share became permanent (Yoshikawa
[1994]). Through this process, real wages caught up with the productivity level.9 This
adjustment contributed greatly to the increase in household disposable income.10 As
a result, the declining trend in the consumption/GDP ratio was curtailed.
The second important element in Japan’s rebalancing was the narrowing of the dif-
ference between the return on capital and the cost of capital. Because Japanese firms
typically raise funds through bank lending, the cost of capital can be approximated
by the bank lending rate. Since the financial liberalization was not accomplished
before the 1980s, the bank lending rate was highly regulated until the 1970s, as is
the present-day China. A comparison of the return on capital and the bank lending
rate in the period before the 1970s shows that the latter was set far below the former
(Figure 7). This suggests that the low cost of capital was one of the key causes of
the investment boom during the high-growth period. However, the monetary tight-
ening during the period of the oil shock and the aforementioned decline in the return
on capital significantly reduced the diﬀerence between the return on capital and the
lending rate in the first half of the 1970s. This means that the cost of capital rapidly
9Strictly speaking, the rise in the labor cost during this period was caused by an increase in
welfare expenses and salary payments related to research and development (Inoue and Nishimura
[2004]). In other words, the rise in the labor share during this period reflected the improvement in
workers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis labor conditions in a broad sense.
10 It is true that the increase in household income was at least partially caused by the Japanese
government’s postwar policies aimed at protecting agriculture and farmers (such as agricultural land
reforms and price supports for agricultural products), which yielded serious agricultural problems
such as excessive rice production. However, the rise in the labor share was observed in a broad range
of industries, particularly in the manufacturing sector (Inoue and Nishimura [1994] and Yoshikawa
[1994]). Accordingly, we judge that the rise in the labor share was more important for the increase
of Japan’s total household income.
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Figure 7: Return on Capital and Cost of Capital in Japan
approached the return on capital during the period.11
This adjustment can be viewed as another important factor in the rebalancing.
As explained above, the distortion in the labor cost was corrected in the early 1970s.
In such an environment, if the cost of capital had been kept low, capital would have
been relatively cheaper than the labor for private-sector firms. This would have made
it hard to reduce firms’ incentives to maintain their high investment. Consequently,
the accomplishment of rebalancing would have been diﬃcult.
4 Insights from Japan’s Experience and Caveats
4.1 Corrections of Factor Cost Distortions
In the previous section, we explained the process of Japan’s rebalancing of economic
growth. In doing so, we stressed the importance of two elements: (1) the rise in the
labor share; and (2) the narrowing of the diﬀerence between the return on capital and
the cost of capital. Our key point here is that to accomplish the rebalancing, cost
distortions concerning labor and capital should be corrected in a harmonious way.
We believe that the same argument is applicable to present-day China. Figure
8 indicates that China’s labor share was kept at low level, especially after the mid-
2000s. This may be because the increase in workers’ real wages has lagged the increase
in labor productivity (Figure 9). However, in more recent years, real wage growth
seems to be in the process of catching up with labor productivity growth. Because
of this movement, China’s labor share has begun to rise in recent years.
11Takeda (1985) estimates the eﬀective bank lending rate, by taking account of the deposits held
by borrowers. His results suggest that the eﬀective rate was higher than the face rate. However, his
findings also imply that the diﬀerence between the return on capital and the cost of capital shrank
rapidly in the early 1970s, even if the eﬀective rate was used as the measure of the cost of capital.
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Figure 8: Labor Share in China
Figure 9: Labor Productivity and Real Wage in China
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Figure 10: Number of Labor Disputes in China
What is the background to the recent rise in China’s labor share? One potential
factor is the reduction of the amount of surplus labor in rural areas. An important
question here is whether or not the Lewis turning point had been reached in China.
In the recent literature, this issue is highly controversial.12 Because analyses diﬀer
greatly in terms of data or empirical strategies, it is diﬃcult to derive a decisive
conclusion. In addition, since many of the previous studies use data until the mid-
2000s, it is even harder to judge whether the turning point was reached in the late
2000s. However, as suggested by Knight, Quheng, and Shi (2011), because of labor
market segmentation due to restrictions on rural-urban labor migration (which we
will discuss later), it is possible that upward pressures exist on real wages (especially
in urban areas) even if the Lewis turning point has not been actually reached.
Another background factor to the increase of real wages is the enhancement of
workers’ awareness of labor rights, triggered by institutional reforms in China’s labor
market. Since the Labor Contract Law was enforced in January 2008, the number
of labor disputes has been surging. The government ordered each employer to make
contracts with its employees; as a result, the number of labor disputes accepted by
judicial courts reached 700,000 in 2008 (Figure 10). In 2010, when local governments
raised minimum wages that legally bound employers, labor disputes surged again.
Labor unions, which in the past tended to support employers, have started playing a
more important role in enabling employers and employees to reach agreement.
These movements resemble the case of Japan in the early 1970s. Based on the
12By investigating various statistics on the rural labor force, Cai and Wang (2008) suggest that the
turning point is approaching in recent China. Zhang et.al (2010) use the micro-level wage data in
six provinces and conclude that the turning point in China has already arrived in 2003. In contrast,
Minami and Ma (2010) claim that the turning point was not yet passed (at least in the first half of
the 2000s) by comparing the marginal productivity and the real wage in China’s agricultural sector.
Although we cannot list all other related studies, some recent analyses are provided by Du and Wang
(2010), Wang (2010), and Garnaut (2010), for instance.
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Figure 11: Return on Capital and Cost of Capital in China
experience of Japan, China should see to it that labor movements smoothly promote
the steady growth of real wages and contribute to enhancing workers’ living standards.
This would lay the foundation for a rise in the consumption/GDP ratio.
The other important point is that the cost of capital should be closer to the return
on capital when real wages catch up with the productivity of labor. In the case of
China, interest rates have been regulated far below the return on capital (Figure 11).
The diﬀerence between the return on capital and the bank lending rate broadened
in the 2000s. The cheap cost of capital has been one of the causes of the increase
in the investment/GDP ratio in the 2000s. Looking ahead, if China fails to narrow
the gap between the cost of capital and the return on capital when the cost of labor
rises significantly, the cost of capital compared to that of labor will become cheaper
and industries will naturally become more capital-intensive, which is contrary to the
government’s objective announced in its Five-Year Plan.
4.2 Caveats: Diﬀerences between China Today and Japan in the
1970s
We have indicated two key elements from the experience of Japan’s domestic re-
balancing in the early 1970s. However, in considering how China can rebalance its
economic growth, we should also bear in mind several diﬀerences between the two
countries. China, for example, has unique problematic institutional factors that have
lowered its consumption/GDP ratio. Addressing such institutional problems is also
necessary for China to rebalance suﬃciently its economic growth. Below, we indicate
two such problems.
(1) Public Spending on Education, Health Care, Housing, and Pensions
As discussed earlier, the investment/GDP ratio in China is much larger than that
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in Japan in the 1970s. We believe the diﬀerence stems in part from the institutional
reforms that China implemented in the late 1990s. The reform of state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) began in the late 1990s, when the SOEs laid oﬀ a massive number of
employees. SOEs were freed substantially from the burden of paying for employees’
housing, education, health care, and pensions. As a consequence, the labor share
declined. At the same time, the consumption/GDP ratio dropped partly because
the laid-oﬀ employees spent less and partly because workers needed to save money
for future expenses such as housing, education, health care, and pensions. Chamon
and Prasad (2010) find that the household saving rate rose because the expenses of
education, health care, and housing became a new burden on households after the
SOE reform. To boost the labor share and thus raise consumption, therefore, beef-
ing up only the bargaining power of workers may be insuﬃcient. The government
should expand public spending on housing, education, and health care and devise a
sustainable reform of public pensions.
(2) The Hukou System and the Government Land Purchase System
During the high-growth period in Japan, many rural migrant workers settled
in urban areas and started families. This movement boosted consumption in urban
areas. Moreover, rural farmers near urban areas obtained generous amounts of money
by selling their land to real estate developers. In these ways, the urbanization process
increased Japanese households’ income significantly and supported strong growth in
consumption. However, urbanization in China has diﬀered greatly from Japan in
this regard, in that it has not added substantially to the wealth of households. Key
factors behind this result are the Hukou system, China’s unique registration system,
and the government’s land purchase system.
Under the stringent Hukou system, Chinese rural migrants enjoy little public
support for education, health care, and pensions in the urban areas where they live.
Accordingly, very few rural migrants are able to settle in urban areas and start
families. Huang (2010) found that China’s urbanization has improved the income
position of rural migrant workers substantially but may have increased their precau-
tionary saving motivation, because the public support they receive in cities is quite
limited.13
In addition, because of the government’s land purchase system, the current ur-
banization process is unfavorable to rural households. Local governments typically
earn income through real estate development by expropriating land from farmers at a
cost approximating the land’s agricultural productive value, and then selling it to real
estate developers at the value of an urban district. Thus, the benefit of urbanization
accrues much more to local governments and developers than to farmers.
13According to his survey, saving rates of rural migrant workers in Guangzhou and Shenzhen were
above 40 percent, much higher than urban Hukou residents of 16 percent and 27 percent in 2007.
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Reform of the Hukou system and the government’s land purchase system will
enable household income and consumption to grow more vigorously.
5 Does Domestic Rebalancing Lead to External Rebal-
ancing?
As we have seen in the preceding sections, Japan’s experience suggests that to achieve
the rebalancing of domestic economy, it is essential to correct the distortions in factor
cost (labor cost and capital cost) in a harmonious way.
In a recent study, Huang and Wang (2010) and Huang and Tao (2011) insist that
correcting factor cost distortions is a fundamental solution to the imbalance problem
in China. The former stress that “the root cause of the imbalance problem lies in
factor cost distortions, which were again a result of the asymmetric reform approach:
complete liberalization of the product markets and heavily distorted factor markets.
These distortions are like producer or investor subsidies. They boost corporate profits
but reduce household income” (Huang and Wang [2010], p. 15). With respect to the
rebalancing of domestic economy, our view is fairly close to theirs.
However, they claim further that the correction of factor cost distortions con-
tributes to the reduction of not only the domestic imbalance but also the external
imbalance. They provide their own measures of factor cost distortions and show that
the measures are highly correlated with China’s current account surpluses between
2000 and 2009. Based on this evidence, Huang and Tao (2011) claim that “factor
market distortion leads to unusually large external imbalances, especially large trade
surpluses and current account surpluses. The cost distortion improves exporters’
profitability and exports’ competitiveness in the international markets” (Huang and
Tao [2011], p. 12).
Here, we investigate whether this kind of argument is supported by Japan’s expe-
rience. As we have already explained, the distortions in factor costs were corrected
on both sides — labor and capital — through the first half of the 1970s. During this
period, the external imbalance did not become a serious problem as the ratio of cur-
rent account surplus to GDP was at most 2.5 percent in 1971 and the surplus was not
long-lasting (Figure 12). However, from the mid-1980s the surplus expanded rapidly,
reaching 4.2 percent of GDP in 1986. This indicates that Japan’s external imbalance
problem became particularly serious after the mid-1980s, when a large part of the
factor cost distortions was already eliminated.
This experience tells us that the correction of factor cost distortions does not
necessarily contribute to the reduction of the external imbalance. Of course, China
is not necessarily moving along the same path as Japan in all respects. However,
Japan’s experience is strong at least as a counterexample to the view that domestic
rebalancing contributes to the achievement of external rebalancing.
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Figure 12: Current Account Balance in Japan
Figure 13: IS Balance in Japan
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To gain a better understanding of Japan’s external imbalance problem, the con-
ventional “IS balance approach” is useful (Figure 13). The economy-wide saving rate
traced a downward trend from the first half of the 1970s. However, since the drop in
the investment rate after the mid-1970s was more rapid than the decline in the saving
rate, the current account surplus expanded. In sectoral levels, particularly important
movements are (1) the sharp decline in the investment rate in the corporate sector
since the early 1970s and (2) the rapid rise in the saving rate in the government
sector in the late 1980s. The investment excess in the corporate sector was reduced
structurally as a result of the acute impairment of the investment rate due to the
rapid decline in the return on capital. Given this background, the saving rate in the
government sector increased greatly in the late 1980s, owing to the cyclical increase
in tax revenue during the bubble period. These elements brought about a very large
current account surplus in the latter half of the 1980s.
When considering the IS balance of the Chinese economy in the future, it is as-
sumed that the investment rate will decrease at some stage if the return on capital
decreases due to the slowdown in productivity growth and the deceleration of urban-
ization. If the pace of decline in the investment rate exceeds that in the saving rate,
the current account surplus will expand, as in the case of Japan.
In considering these aspects, it seems that the corrections of factor cost distortions
do not necessarily contribute to the reduction of China’s current account surplus
(Figure 14), and that various strategies will be needed to influence the decision on
saving and investment, especially measures to reduce the saving rate. Comprehensive
reforms will be required, such as (1) the enhancement of public support for medical
treatment, education, and housing; (2) the enhancement of the public pension system;
and (3) the advancement of a domestic financial market.14
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigated how Japan rebalanced its economic growth mode in the
1970s. We indicated that (1) the rise of the labor share and (2) the narrowing of
the diﬀerence between the return on capital and the cost of capital were the key
elements in Japan’s rebalancing of economic growth. This suggests that, in order to
accomplish the rebalancing, the factor cost (labor cost and capital cost) distortions
should be corrected in a harmonious way. We argue that this finding is applicable
to China’s current situation. In addition, in light of the fact that Japan’s current
surplus widened after the rebalancing of the growth mode, redressing only factor cost
14Kuijs (2006) examines the potential eﬀects of various factors, including demographic changes,
urbanization, corporate dividend policy, financial market reform, and the shift in the composition
of government spending. His estimation suggests that the shift in the composition of government
spending and financial market reform have a relatively large impact in reducing China’s saving-
investment imbalance.
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Figure 14: Current Account Balance in China
distortions may not suﬃce to improve the external imbalance.
If rebalancing is judged necessary, the next question is when China should rebal-
ance its economic growth mode. In this regard, some might consider that Japan’s
experience shows the rebalancing will take place naturally when the growth potential
starts decelerating, and that it is not too late for China to rebalance its economy when
the growth rate starts declining. In fact, China’s urbanization is expected to slow
gradually and China’s labor force will stop increasing and begin decreasing at some
point in the future. These changes will surely decelerate China’s growth potential.
However, we believe that China should start rebalancing right now rather than
later. China’s growth mode is so disproportionately investment-driven that it may be
too late to change its growth mode after the potential growth rate starts declining.
China’s consumption/GDP ratio is far lower and its investment/GDP ratio far higher
than the equivalent ratios in Japan in 1970 and those of other emerging countries
currently. Japan was able to rebalance its growth mode relatively smoothly because
its dependency on investment was more modest than that of China. In China’s case,
given the far higher investment/GDP ratio, it may be diﬃcult to rebalance its growth
mode as smoothly as Japan did. It would be far easier for China to rebalance its
growth mode while maintaining the current high growth. By doing so, China could
prevent the side eﬀects caused by the current growth mode, such as slower job growth,
from becoming too large to deal with.
The Chinese government seems to recognize the immediate need for rebalancing.15
The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15), approved by the National People’s Congress in
15 In his speech at the Boao Forum for Asia on April 15, 2011, President Hu Jintao stated, “In the
next five years, China will make great eﬀorts to implement the strategy of boosting domestic de-
mand, especially consumer demand, and put in place an eﬀective mechanism to unleash consumption
potential. We will ensure that consumption, investment and export contribute to economic growth
in a coordinated way.”
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March 2011, states that in the next five years China needs to transform its mode of
economic development substantively to one in which consumption, investment, and
exports harmoniously sustain economic growth. China changed the target for its an-
nual economic growth from 7.5 percent (2006-10) to 7 percent (2011-15), adding that
the quality and eﬃcacy of economic growth needed to be significantly improved.16
Although many still prioritize the speed of growth over its quality, we hope that




GDP, consumption, and gross fixed capital formation used in Figure 3 are from
the National Accounts published by the Cabinet Oﬃce. Concerning the return on
capital in Figure 4, we basically follow the method of Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006).







³ bP kt − bP yt ´ ,
where rt is the return on capital, αt is the capital share, P kt is the price of capital,
Kt is real capital stock, P
y
t is the price of output goods, Yt is real output, and δt
is the depreciation rate of capital stock. In contrast to Bai, Hsieh and Qian (2006),
we do not include net production tax in the calculation of αt. We use the series of
nominal tangible assets as P kt Kt, nominal GDP as P
y
t Yt, the annual growth rate of the
deflator of gross fixed capital formation as bP kt , and the annual growth rate of the GDP
deflator as bP yt . All of these data are from the National Accounts. The labor share
in Figure 5 is calculated as labor remuneration divided by nominal GDP or national
income (the sum of labor remuneration and business operating surplus), all of which
are from the National Accounts. The number of labor disputes shown in Figure 6
is from the Survey on Labour Disputes published by the Ministry of Health, Labour
and Welfare. The bank lending rate presented in Figure 7 is the long-term prime
lending rate of principal banks published by the Bank of Japan. The current account
shown in Figure 12 is from the balance of payments data released by the Ministry
of Finance and the Bank of Japan. Finally, saving rates (or investment rates) in
16The 12th Five-Year Plan also stipulates that (1) labor compensation should grow at the same
pace of labor productivity, (2) household income should increase by 7 percent, and (3) the minimum
wage standard should increase by no less than 13 percent on average per year, respectively.
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aggregate and sectoral levels presented in Figure 13 are calculated as total saving (or
gross fixed capital formation) divided by nominal GDP in the corresponding sectors.
These data are from the National Accounts.
B. China’s Data
For GDP, consumption, and gross fixed capital formation used in Figure 1, we
obtain the series since 1978 from the China Statistical Yearbook published by the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the series before 1978 from Hsueh and Li
(1999). We calculate per capita household disposable income as the weighted average
of per capita urban household disposable income and per capita net income of rural
household, which are published by the NBS. As for the weight of this calculation, we
use the shares of the urban and rural populations, which are also published by the
NBS. The number of labor disputes shown in Figure 8 is from the China Statistical
Yearbook. The labor share in Figure 9 is calculated as the labor remuneration divided
by nominal GDP or national income. These data since 1978 are from the China
Statistical Yearbook and those before 1978 are from Hsueh and Li (1999). The total
number for employment used to calculate labor productivity and real wages is from
the China Statistical Yearbook. As for the return on capital in Figure 11, we basically
follow the method of Bai, Hsieh and Qian (2006), but do not include net production
tax in the calculation of the capital share. The bank lending rate in the same figure is
the renminbi benchmark loan rate (one year) set by the People’s Bank of China. The
current account balance in Figure 14 is from the balance of payments data released
by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange.
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